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ABSTRACT
In 1891 a financial crisis led Portugal to abandon the gold standard and to
partially default by cutting interest payments on domestic and foreign debt. As a
consequence, the country was banned from borrowing in international financial
markets, until an agreement with foreign bondholders was reached in 1902. That
financial crisis was the result of large current account and government deficits.
Yet the abandonment of the gold standard and default were not imposed by
financial difficulties only. This paper shows that such options were taken because
of the growing domestic consensus regarding the need for a change in monetary
policies. The concern about the domestic economy was more important to the
Portuguese governments than the fear of a negative reaction of foreign
bondholders. Insufficient information about the sustainability of government debt
and lack of cooperation between borrowers left the Portuguese governments with
space to manoeuvre according to their domestic political interests.
1I
After half a century marked by turmoil, military coups and a civil war, in 1851
Portugal’s political life was pacified and entered a period that became known as the
Regeneração which would last for four decades. Monetary stabilization was achieved
immediately after, and in 1854 the country joined the gold standard. Two years later, Portugal
was once more able to borrow in the international capital markets. The ability to borrow
abroad was a major contributing factor towards Portuguese governments’ failure to prioritize
the need for balanced budgets, despite the innumerable political declarations to the contrary.2
Lurking behind the option to maintain budget deficits was the generally accepted idea that the
country needed more infrastructures and the possibility that the government had to raise
capital both at home and abroad by issuing bonds. The financial disequilibrium that marked
the period of the Regeneração was also a consequence of the difficulties that the state
experienced in increasing tax revenues, along with the need to expand the administrative
functions and to invest in improving the country’s infrastructure (as a result, Portugal’s public
debt, increased from 38% of GDP in 1854-59 to close to 81% in the 1880-89). In 1891, this
period of easy borrowing came to an end with a financial crisis.3
Despite all the ensuing financial problems, the years from 1851 to 1891 were marked
by a few positive features. Firstly, Portugal complied rather satisfactorily with the measures
that were imposed by the gold standard and from 1854 to 1891 the convertibility of the
currency was only suspended for a few days during a banking crisis in 1876.4 The high level
of public debt, after all, did not represent an excessive burden for Portuguese capital markets,
in the sense that interest rates were not particularly affected by public borrowing. In other
words, the financing of the public deficit did not crowd out Portugal’s private capital
markets.5 Moreover, public investment in infrastructures, such as railways, roads and other
2social overhead capital, stimulated the economy.6 After 1891 the economy kept its pace of
growth, because of increased tariff protection, which was combined with effect of currency
depreciation, and the enforcement of the system of imperial trade preference.7
The 1891 financial crisis was a consequence of the difficulties encountered by the
Bank of Portugal in supplying gold in the manner set down in the monetary regulations
governing the gold standard, and in the government’s inability to fully honour the interest
returns on the national and foreign public debt. The short-term causes for the crisis include,
firstly, the fact that in the years since 1885, the trade deficit aggravated because of declining
exports and a persistent raise in imports. Secondly, the crisis was due to a sharp fall in
emigrant remittances from Brazil, due to high political instability and high inflation there.
Thirdly, the crisis was also a consequence of the contraction of foreign capital markets in the
wake of the Baring crisis.8
As a means of resolving its payments difficulties, the government decided to abandon
the gold standard in 1891, and to forcibly reduce the interest on both national and foreign
debts in 1892. As a consequence, between 1892 and 1902, Portugal was effectively banned
from financing its public debts with loans raised on the international financial markets.
In order to understand why Portugal defaulted partially in 1892, we need to take into
account two crucial factors. The first is that governments in Lisbon were not particularly
concerned with the negative impact of default in the capacity of the state to borrow in the
international capital markets. The second factor is that foreign lenders did not scrutinize
closely enough government accounts across the world because the means to do so were far
from well developed in this period and because foreign investors were competing among
themselves.9
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) posit three reasons for countries to repay their foreign debt:
the appropriation of collateral by lenders; sanctions imposed by lenders; and the ability to
3keep borrowing in the future.10 Portugal’s foreign debt did not involve collateral, so that was
not a problem. Sanctions by debtors were hard to come by, as most foreign governments did
not back private lenders. Moreover, most of the debt was placed in Paris and Berlin, and
Portugal’s largest trading partner was Great Britain. The only negative consequence of default
was the inability to keep borrowing in the future. This paper shows that this was clearly a
consequence that Portuguese governments feared less than domestic reactions to restrictive
monetary policies. And the ability to borrow in the international markets was re-established
after a decade with the agreement with foreign bondholders in 1902.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by reconstructing the historical
circumstances that preceded the crisis, showing how changes in the government led to a sharp
increase in the public deficit which went along with the increase in the credibility of the
Portuguese state debt in foreign markets. Section 3 provides a description of the emergence of
the crisis and we identify the different policies to cope with it. Section 4 shows the emergence
of the consensus to solve the crisis in which the two main ruling parties and their political
offshoots showed more concern with the domestic economy than with foreign creditors. The
last section concludes by setting the Portuguese case in the appropriate international context
in order to draw lessons for the functioning of the international financial markets.
II
The 1851 Regeneração military coup led to political pacification and inaugurated a
period of development for Portuguese institutions in many domains, namely the political and
legal systems, property and civil rights, and institutions related to trade and industry.
Pacification also paved the way to developments in the construction of infrastructures, such as
roads and railways, and higher levels of investment in education. The extent of these
4developments was limited in comparative terms, as Portugal was by then the most backward
country in western Europe, and remained in that position for a long period of time.
The coup also led to the emergence of a bipartisan regime, which was to be dominated
by the Partido Regenerador, on the right, and the Partido Histórico, on the left, both founded
in 1852. In 1876 the left regrouped in the new Partido Progressita.11 The regeneradores were
for most of the time in power, particularly after 1870, and on the left the progressistas were
able to form government only during a brief period from 1879-81 and in 1886.12 The electoral
system was not fully competitive, as polls were called and organized by government and in
every election during the years from 1852 to 1910, only twice did the ruling party lost
elections.
Government decisions in Portugal’s nineteenth century history were increasingly
marked by the need to cope with the demands from different political groups within the
country. Such evolution affected the way financial policy was conducted. In 1851 it was
crucial for the coming government to regain the confidence of international markets in order
to finance the government activity through foreign lending. Such confidence was achieved in
1856.
In 1886, the left came to power and remained there for the next four years, which was
the longest period until then. After thirty years of dominance by the regeneradores, new
priorities were set and the governments became more concerned in dealing with the increasing
domestic political instability and foreign lenders were less of a threat for government stability.
The government formed by the Partido Progressista had as Finance Minister Mariano de
Carvalho, who showed from the very beginning that he wanted to change the financial system
with which the right had ruled the country. At the presentation of his first state budget in
Parliament, at the beginning of 1887, the new Minister outlined an ambitious plan that
implied profound reforms of the three institutions that controlled the main sources of state
5revenues. Firstly, he wanted to change the legislation concerning the taxation of tobacco
imports and manufacture, which were the single largest item in state revenues. Secondly, the
control of the government over the Bank of Portugal, the largest joint-stock bank in the
country which had the monopoly of issuing notes in Lisbon, was to be increased. Thirdly, the
Junta do Crédito Público, which was a committee that issued state bonds and made the
payments to the public, was to be stripped of its supervising functions, which were seen as too
independent from the government, and the supervision of the public debt was made directly
dependent of the Ministry of Finance. These were three of the more important pillars of the
financial system built by the regeneradores across several decades that Carvalho wanted to
change.13
The change in the tobacco regime led to an extraordinary increase in government
expenditures. Tobacco had been a monopoly sold to private contractors until 1865, when the
government liberalized imports and manufacture and instead charged an excise duty on tobacco
imports. From 1879 onwards, a tax on domestic tobacco production was also imposed.
However, the tobacco industry’s gradually developed into a de facto monopoly controlled by
the Companhia Nacional de Tabacos (National Tobacco Company) which owned the larger
factories in Lisbon and Oporto.14 In December 1886, the board of the tobacco company
petitioned the government for the concession of a de jure monopoly. The concession of that
monopoly would imply a substantial change in the administration of public finances and the
leading financiers in Portugal were of course aware of that. The most pre-eminent Portuguese
banker, of Belgian ascendant, the Count of Burnay, whose fortune was made during the
decades of rule of the Partido Regenerador, expressed his interest in buying the tobacco
monopoly, and demanded that the matter be put out to tender. But Mariano de Carvalho did not
want Burnay to control the monopoly and decided to establish a state monopoly or régie,
instead, which was a costly move. He had however full support from his party colleagues.15
6The other two important changes that Carvalho imposed, namely the new statute for
the Bank of Portugal and the end of the role of Junta de Crédito Público as a supervising
board of the state debt, did not entail increase in public expenditures. The new law on the
Bank of Portugal aimed at getting higher revenue for the government by instituting profit
sharing, providing cheaper credit through a special current account for the Treasury, and give
greater solidity to the banking system. But the reform of the Bank of Portugal and the Junta
de Crédito Público also paved the way for a higher level of government’s independence
towards private capital owners, both large, as it was the case of the bank, and small, which
was the case of the public that purchased government bonds from the Junta. That higher level
of independence of the government towards the financial world would be crucial in the near
future.
In order to provide the funds for the creation of the tobacco state monopoly, the
Finance Minister had to ask for a parliamentary authorization for a public loan up to 7,200
contos.16 The lower chamber of the Parliament in which the government had a majority of
vote approved this operation in May 1888. The total cost of indemnities paid by the
government for the expropriation of the tobacco companies was slightly below the limit for
the loan conceded by the Parliament but they nevertheless reached the astonishing sum of
6,333 contos.17 This implied the doubling of government deficit in just two years to 11,526
contos in the fiscal year of 1888-89 (see Figures 1 and 2). In this way, this budgetary heading
increased to account for 23 percent of total state expenditure. In virtue of the fact that the loan
that was contracted to finance the creation of the state’s monopoly of the tobacco industry was
not compensated by any increase in the state’s revenues, the public deficit increased from
6,887 to 11,998 contos .18 This was the true cost of the change of power in one of the pillars
in which the new progressista government wanted to touch. Carvalho was able to go ahead
with his plan because his ultimate purpose was to use the revenues from the state monopoly to
7fund the public debt.19 In no occasion at this stage was there any concern shown on the
reaction of foreign creditors.
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
Mariano de Carvalho’s revolutionary plans were ambitious but were met with little
opposition from the regeneradores. This party was weakened by the death of its historic leader,
Fontes Pereira de Melo, in January 1887, and by the ensuing internal struggles for succession.
But the plans met little opposition apparently also because there was some consensus in relation
to the need to step up the control of the state on the financial institutions that dealt with public
debt and monopolies – at least that is what we can infer from the fact that Carvalho’s reforms
were kept even after the regeneradores regained full control of the government, ten years later.
The reforms proposed by Mariano de Carvalho were a heavy financial burden, but the Minister
could be less worried with that because he came to power in a period which was relatively
favourable for state finances. In fact, in the beginning of 1887, the 3 percent bonds were quoted
at 82.6 percent (which implied a real interest of 3.63 percent), which was an historic high. On
September of the previous year the issue price was 69.6 percent (or a real interest of 4.31
percent).20 The spread between the Portuguese and the British consoles declined from the 1885
peak at 3.78 percentage points to 2.28 in 1887 (see Figure 3). Moreover, between the fiscal
years of 1885-6 and that of 1886-7, the state’s effective receipts increased by 10 percent, while
the deficit decreased by 25 percent, from around 9,400 to 7,100 contos (see Figure 1 above).
The markets reacted positively to the reforms and there was an improvement in the state’s
credit rating and the reasonable quotation for its funds. Between 1886 and 1889, the average
price of Portuguese bonds in the secondary market in London increased by 33 percent and in
Lisbon by 29 percent.21 The spread of Portuguese consols declined to an historical minimum in
1889 of 1.83 percentage points.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
8Creditors abroad were only just becoming worried about the solvability of the
Portuguese state. In 1885, the Economist warned that ‘in the interest of Portugal herself it
would be well if her facilities for borrowing were now curtailed’.22 Portugal managed
however to keep borrowing abroad because of a shift from London to Paris and then Berlin as
main sources for capital.23 The Portuguese government was taking advantage of the high
degree of competition in the international financial markets, which was arguably one of the
main reasons why investors did not exert a higher level of control on how their funds were
spent. The government was also taking advantage of the fact that the mechanisms of
assessment of the solvability of governments was still in its infancy. For exmaple, it was only
during the 1880s that Crédit Lyonnais, one of the largest European banks, inaugurated its
Service des études financières, and thus began collecting information on foreign governments
and rating their levels of solvability.24
The Portuguese finance Minister did not have the time to carry out fully his plan on
the tobacco monopoly because he was ousted from government in November 1889, following
a financial scandal, and the whole government fell shortly after.25 The government fell
because of the ambition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barros Gomes, who had provoked
the British government by publishing a map – which became known as the rose-colored map
– where the Portuguese southern African colonies were carved out from coast to coast,
including the area that would became Rhodesia, and making some troop movements
accordingly. That led to an ultimatum of the British government in January 1890 which was
met in outrage in Portugal and to the fall of the government from the Partido Progressista
and, ultimately, to the interruption for a decade of the bi-partisan system that had governed
the country since 1870.
9III
The fall of the progressista cabinet was followed by a period of increasing political
instability, because there was a high level of unrest in the streets against not only the two main
parties, but also against the monarchy, led by the emerging republican forces. But unrest was
also a consequence of the fact that the right-wing Partido Regenerador was living a period of
some instability. The death of the historical leader, Fontes, a few years before, gave place to
fierce internal struggles within the party. The new leader, Serpa Pimentel, was an aging man
that did not control the party. He ultimately was compelled to form a cabinet which included
the three men that fought for his succession and it was no time before they made opposition to
each other in Parliament and his government only lasted two months.26 In October 1890, Serpa
was replaced as Prime Minister by non-partisan General João Crisóstomo, an 80-year old army
officer who had however been linked in the past to the left, that is to the Partido Progressista.27
This was supposedly an independent cabinet, but clearly this was a time in which the
progressistas were ahead in the race for power. Crisóstomo appointed as Finance Minister
someone that was very close to the former progressista minister, Carvalho, Augusto José da
Cunha. According to one observer, this was an attempt to ‘give a more Progressive colour to
the situation,’ and he criticized the new Minister for accepting the position.28
Thus, it was a fragile new finance Minister that had to face the emergence of the
financial crisis, which as he later described in Parliament, appeared to him as follows:
When on 24 November last year [1890] I took control of the Finances, I saw the
urgent and pressing need to obtain gold for the Portuguese market […] and by the
race that had been provoked against Montepio Geral [Portugal’s largest savings
bank], that has obliged my honourable predecessors to use up all the Treasury’s
credits in London and Paris. Thus, not only were there no resources ready with
which to proceed to the payment of bills with the next earnings on account of the
floating debt, which then was standing at 33,800 contos, but it was pressing and
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urgent, in any operation that was made, to secure the means necessary to pay the
external coupon that was due on 1 January.29
In fact, the Bank of Portugal ceased, in 1890, to have the ability ‘to provide the market with all
the exchange that was requested,’ which ‘came from the export of produce, from Brazilian
remittances and from funds that the Treasury had obtained abroad through the realization of
credit operations.’ By one account:
By the end of April [1890], the Bank had only managed to purchase £1,564,384
[7,040 contos] while it had sold £2,664,114 [11,989 contos]. Additionally, the
foreign loans obtained by the Bank had declined by 2,000 contos.30
As such, there was an excess demand for gold that amounted to 6,949 contos, including the
2,000 contos reduction in the Bank of Portugal’s credit ceiling abroad and 4,949 contos that
was the result of the difference between the value of the gold that the Bank had provided to the
market and the value that it had managed to purchase.31 In order to balance the external
accounts, and in the absence of any other means of foreign payment, it became necessary to
export gold. A country that, thanks to exports, emigrant remittances and to foreign credit, had
traditionally been a receiver of gold coins was now forced to export 21,535 contos worth of
gold. This was a considerable proportion of the country’s monetary circulation.32 Thus,
suspension occurred because the state suffered a liquidity crunch in the spring of 1891 and had
to ask the Bank of Portugal to issue notes in order to be able to lend it fresh funds. Since the
Bank was unable to acquire additional gold for backing them, it had to suspend payments in
gold, until the state paid back its debts, which never happened.
In a move to obviate the state’s difficulties, in November 1890 the Finance Minister
attempted to arrange a foreign loan that could help pay the coupon that was due, but he was
unsuccessful. In the meantime, the London stock-market had been shaken by problems being
experienced by the Baring Brothers’ Bank, whose business was mainly with Latin American
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countries, and which was the Portuguese state’s main banker in the City.
It was at this moment that the Count of Burnay, the financier who had been excluded
from the tobacco industry negotiation by Mariano de Carvalho, appeared with an offer which
consisted of a ‘temporary loan’ of 13,500 contos that he had negotiated with the Comptoir
d'Éscompte, and which was based on the mortgage of the state tobacco monopoly’s revenues.
The tobacco monopoly was again a central problem, as well as one way of solving Portugal’s
financial problems. Burnay was now seeking to secure indirect control of the tobacco
contract.33 Ironically or not, he proposed something that the 1888 tobacco law, which was made
against his wish, had envisaged, one of the main purposes of the tobacco monopoly had been to
underwrite state borrowing. As the finance Minister, Cunha, was later to declare in Parliament,
Burnay’s proposal was sufficient to service foreign short-term debt until 1 April 1891. This was
not fresh money though, as it consisted of transferring credits that the banker had over the
Portuguese state to the Comptoir d'Éscompte and adding to them the guarantee of the proceeds
of the tobacco monopoly’s earnings, which were state revenues. This was a rather typical
financial operation at the time.
The new tobacco contract was to remain in force until 1926, during which time the
contractors agreed to pay an annual fee of 4,250 contos (to be increased to 4,500 contos soon
after) and made up to 36,000 contos available in loans to the state (these amounts would be
reduced by commission fees), thus providing crucial breathing space for the Minister of
Finance, who pointed out that this was a provisional contract from which the government could
‘liberate’ itself at any moment.34
The tobacco contract was signed in February 1891. However, to avoid the opposition in
the Chamber of Deputies and in the press, neither the Finance Minister sought parliamentary
approval, nor the Prime Minister got any guarantee of support from the two main political
parties. The main reason for the political discontent surrounding the contract was the fact that
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the majority of the members of the monopoly’s administrative body were foreigners.35
Moreover, the Parliament, at the request of the contracting company, was obliged to prolong its
session in order to pass the contract into law. In March 1891, the Chamber of Deputies’
Finance Commission formally proposed the law and warned deputies that amendments to it
were solely a ‘ministerial matter.’ In effect, what the government was saying was that it would
resign before accepting any substantial alterations. Consequently, the contract was approved by
a Law, dated 23 March 1891.
Two members of Parliament who were later to become Finance ministers reacted
against the law on the tobacco industry. The first of these was Augusto Fuschini, a critic of the
rule from the regeneradores, who introduced a somewhat gentle opposition to the project.36 He
criticized Cunha for placing the negotiations for foreign loans to the Portuguese state into the
hands of one banker, attributing this to his lack of understanding of financial affairs. Fuschini
went on to praise Mariano de Carvalho who, he argued, had managed correctly public finances
against the ‘bankers’ interests’.’37 Some years later, Fuschini was to classify the Cunha’s
operation as ‘one of the greatest errors committed during the constitutional administration’.38
José Dias Ferreira, the second deputy to announce his opposition to the tobacco
contract, accused Cunha of seeking to reward the Count of Burnay at a moment when there
were alternatives to the contract being negotiated. According to him, Portuguese 3 percent
public debt bonds were being issued at 58 percent, which implied a real interest rate of 5.17
percent. This enabled him to conclude that ‘in no way did this suggest that there was a serious
credit problem, making it difficult to understand the need to obtain a loan at 8 percent’39 In his
reply, the Finance Minister reminded Dias Ferreira that the government had to deal with a
floating debt, the extent of which had not been seen since 1846. He went on to remind him that
he had inherited the negotiations with the Count of Burnay from his ministerial predecessors.
He concluded by stating:
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I know only the following methods of contracting loans: a national subscription,
the competitive tender between bankers or direct negotiations between the
government and a syndicate. (…) It could perhaps be that the honourable deputy
would like to see the Minister reduced to the condition of a beggar who knocks
from door to door.
Absolving himself of all responsibility for this affair and preserving his image for the future of
non-allegiance with the governments of either party, Dias Ferreira responded:
The two largest parties thus reserve for themselves the glory of responsibility for
the approval of this measure, and leave those without parties the right to criticize
and the freedom to vote.40
With some difficulty, Crisóstomo’s government managed to pay the interest on the external
debt in 1891.41 However, there was no alteration in the total level of public debt and its
respective charges. The Portuguese state’s receipts from the new tobacco contract rose to 5,011
contos, in 1891-2, which represented a substantial increase relative to the last year of the free
trade regime, during which the tobacco duty collected by customs totalled 2,829 contos.
However, the state’s total revenues remained unchanged because the remaining revenues
declined by roughly the same amount.42 As a consequence of this, in May 1891 the government
accepted the contingent need to suspend the currency’s convertibility for a period of 60 days.
This was to be Augusto José da Cunha’s final act before Carvalho’s comeback as the ‘saviour’,
as Fuschini had predicted.43
Mariano de Carvalho returned to the ministry of Finance in a government still led by
João Crisóstomo, at the end of May 1891. The political situation was still far from clear. In
fact, the Partido Progressista was represented by a man who was not in total agreement with
the party’s leader, while the Partido Regenerador had representation for all of its principal
factions. Apparently, one of them (Lopo Vaz) got on well with Mariano de Carvalho, and
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expected from him to solve the Treasury’s situation without having to resort to default or
swinging budget cuts.44 This alliance kept the Cabinet in power for almost eight months, thus
delaying the drastic measures that were to be taken by more radical members on the left later
on.45
Mariano de Carvalho started off again as a finance Minister by presenting an extensive
new series of reforms to the Chamber of Deputies in June 1891. To his supporters, which were
many, those measures were another demonstration of the Minister’s ability to rule public
finances. But he was also severely attacked in Parliament. One experienced deputy, José
Frederico Laranjo, attacked the proposals for being over-ambitious, as the Minister wanted ‘to
reform at will almost every aspect of the public economy: the currency, the banks, taxes,
payment for public works, the fishing industry, emigration, etc., etc.’. In fact, Carvalho wanted
to revise once more the contract with the Bank of Portugal, to introduce silver coins and thus a
bimetallic standard, and to restore a monopoly in the alcohol industry.46 The plan was defeated
in Parliament with an odd alliance across parties, with the leader of the Chamber, who
belonged to the same party as Carvalho, voting against it, together with the regeneradores and
the three republican deputies.
But the proposed reforms served as a cover up for more serious measures, which the
Minister carried out anyway, because they did not need parliamentary approval. Moreover, the
Minister was also backed by his alliance with a faction of the regeneradores. Thus, on 9 July
1891, he signed a decree that prorogued the suspension of Bank of Portugal banknotes’
convertibility into gold or silver that had been introduced as a temporary measure two months
earlier. This same decree confirmed the Bank of Portugal as the country’s only issuing bank,
and granted it the right to replace the Oporto banks’ notes with its own. Portugal’s
abandonment of the gold standard opened the way for the state to finance itself through the
emission of banknotes by the Bank of Portugal. Of all the measures to resolve the crisis that
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Carvalho had at his disposal, this was probably the one that had the least domestic and external
implications. His over-riding objective was to halt the steady decline in the Bank of Portugal’s
gold reserves (see Figure 4). In December 1891, a new statute increased the fiduciary
circulation limit to 38,000 contos (which could be further raised by reinforcing the Bank’s
capital reserves). This same statute also increased the government’s Bank of Portugal current
account credit limit from 2,000 to 6,000 contos for the financial year 1891-2.47 The change of
the bank’s law in 1887 was now making its effects.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Mariano de Carvalho’s time in office was running out, however. Lopo Vaz, who had
previously been an ally of his, was involved in discussions with Oliveira Martins (the minister
of Finance that would follow suit) and King D. Carlos to ensure a more direct political
intervention that would put an end to the vicious circle into which Portugal’s public finances
had fallen. In order to remove Carvalho and General Crisóstomo’s government from power, it
was only necessary to recall that the Finance Minister had not sought the necessary government
permissions to grant loans to the Banco Lusitano and the Companhia Real dos Caminhos de
Ferro, both of which were controlled by syndicates led by two financiers (Marquis of Foz and
the Count of Moser) who were politically sympathetic towards the Finance Minister, and who
had, on several occasions, been in competition with the Count of Burnay. This was the pretext
that led to Carvalho leaving the Cabinet in much the same way as he had in 1889.
IV
José Dias Ferreira was chosen to lead the next government, which included Oliveira
Martins as Minister of Finance, as well as several other leading notables, almost all of whom
were serving in government for the first time. The fact that the government depended on
newcomers that had spent their days criticizing the financial policy of the two main parties for a
16
long time, paved the way to a radical solution. Ferreira and Martins did not want to see
themselves identified with past policies and Martins had for long advocated radical changes in
the conduction of Portugal’s economic and financial policies. The events that were to occur
during 1892 were the consequence of the new Finance Minister’s deliberately chosen policies.
Once again, the main challenge he faced was servicing the state’s domestic and foreign debts.
However, the path that Oliveira Martins decided upon was not the only option available to him,
nor was it necessarily the best.48
Oliveira Martins had spent several years contesting what he described as the
regenerador or fontista policy that consisted in the maintenance of unbalanced state budgets
that were financed through the public debt. According to him, this policy had failed to create
the necessary wealth within the country, but it did serve to enrich bankers and government
officials.49 Now that he was Finance Minister, he saw the opportunity to break the vicious
circle. His remedy consisted of increasing taxes to balance the state’s accounts, rather than
resorting to more debt issues. At the beginning of 1892, Martins put this plan into action by
addressing the only immediately accessible and secure taxation source: the earnings of public
debt bonds. It was a highly unpopular move that no-one had dared to venture. Through it, he
delivered a profound shock to the Portuguese financial system changing rules that had been
considered sacrosanct for almost 40 years. With this measure, the state’s credit rating suffered,
both inside the country and abroad, as did the monetary circulation, the banking system and
thousands of individuals whose savings were held in debt bonds, purchased in the Junta do
Crédito Público, and in public Treasury bonds acquired in the Lisbon stock-exchange.50
During the presentation of the state budget in Parliament, in January 1892, when, as
usual reforms were announced, Oliveira Martins provided a diagnosis of the situation, which
led him to conclude for the need for drastic measures. He began by pointing out that the state
accounts for 1890-91 showed a deficit of 11,550 contos, a figure that represented 29 percent of
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all government receipts. He further estimated that, during the ten months to June 1892, the
minimum level of the deficit was to mount to 10,000 contos.51 With respect to the Treasury, the
Minister estimated that the floating debt had risen to 23,000 contos, ¾ of which held in the
country, with the remaining being held abroad. He stated that the government did not have the
funds with which to service this debt.52
The government’s margin for manoeuvre was not large, but there was still some
flexibility. Although the tobacco monopoly’s earnings had already been allocated, the state still
had some secure earnings sources that could be used as loan guarantees. Still available too were
the revenues from import duties (which were used to this end by Hintze Ribeiro’s regenerador
government in 1902 as a means to restore financial stability).53 Despite all difficulties, the
Portuguese governments were still able to oppose a more direct control of government accounts
by representatives of foreign bondholders, contrarily to what happened to Greece some years
later on. This was, nevertheless, a fate that Fuschini, during the December 1890 debate on the
loan secured on tobacco revenues, had stated he feared may befall on Portugal. The advantage
point of Portugal was not that it had a higher degree of solvency, but the fact that international
political scene run in its favour.54
Oliveira Martins went on in the Parliament to note that the state had large amounts of
credit at its disposal from banks and other companies, credits that had been granted to assist
these institutions during previous periods of crisis. The Marquis of Foz and Count Moser’s
Salamanca Syndicate owed the state 5,350 contos; the Banco Lusitano owed 500 contos; while
the Companhia Real de Caminhos de Ferro, the largest railways company in Portugal, was
indebted to the state to the tune of 4,390 contos; the Bank of Portugal received 1,044 contos
worth of state guarantees to be used to fund loans to other banks; finally, the Companhia da
Mala Real Portuguesa, the postal monopoly, owed the state 910 contos. In total, between all of
the identified credits and guarantees, the Treasury was owed 11,210 contos, and had a further
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1,796 contos in guarantees, what made a total of 13,006 contos. The Finance Minister
concluded: ‘The large sum of Treasury credits is sufficient, in itself, to reduce the floating debt
by half; however, this is not possible within any certain timescale.’55 According to one
contemporary observer, by his choosing not to exert pressure on the companies to repay their
debt to the state, Oliveira Martins was repeating the policy which was adopted during the first
phase of the 1876 crisis, during which the government sought ‘to save the two or three large
companies in the country that had been compromised by the currency’s devaluation, and which
were prevented from complying with urgent foreign agreements.’ Unlike in 1876, however, in
1891 the state was forced to seek assistance from the Bank of Portugal, using legal means to
pay and increasing the fiduciary circulation.56
To aggravate an already difficult situation, the 36,000 contos loan, which had been
anticipated during the tobacco contract negotiated with Henry Burnay in February 1891, had
failed to fully materialize, as the markets no longer wished to lend to the Portuguese state on
the terms that it was able to offer.57
Unwilling to recoup its credits and guarantees, which were worth 13,000 contos, and
unable to seek recourse to domestic or foreign credits, the only alternative left to the Minister
of Finance was to increase the state’s revenues. In order to do so, Martins recovered a law of
1880, and proposed to increase the tax on civil servants’ earnings, including those employed by
corporations and charitable establishments, whether or not they were subsidized by the state,
from 3 to 10 percent.58 He also proposed to increase the tax on earnings from internal debt
bonds and all the various types of credit titles, from 3 to 30 percent. Finally, he proposed a pact
with the foreign creditors.59 He concluded his exposition by listing the measures he intended to
take:
The government calculates that the sacrifices demanded of the creditors, public
employees and the tax-payers will raise a sum in excess of 8,500 contos; and that
the administrative economies – the value of which cannot yet be determined, for
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fear of creating anarchy within the services – when added to the tax earnings from
the production of alcohol, matches and oils, will reach 1,500 contos.60
The 10,000 contos deficit was thus resolved in this single set of measures. Apparently, Martins
preferred to default, albeit only partially, on the domestic debt and to negotiate with the
creditors afterwards.61
In Parliament, Augusto Fuschini proposed that there should be no interference in the
interest rates payable on the external debt and that interest on the internal debt should not be
taxed at more than 10 percent. It was possible, according to him, to balance the budget by
‘fixing the debt at a convenient level and seeking other, more just, taxes with greater
coverage.’62 For this financier, reducing the public debt was not an absolute priority. He
believed that it was more important to ensure that the sacrifices that were being imposed on the
population in order to combat the financial crisis affecting the country were fair. Fuschini also
believed that Martins’ proposal to tax the interest earned on foreign debt bonds would
undermine the state’s ability to obtain new foreign loans. This was an opinion that was shared
by other deputies, and which was eventually supported by the Parliament’s Finance Committee.
Fuschini highlighted another problem with Oliveira Martins’ proposed law. He stated
that, ‘the laws regulating disentitlement forced a large number of religious and charitable
institutions and establishments to transform their fixed capital into bonds…,’ concluding that,
‘the proposals under discussion, with their 30 percent tax on earnings from domestic debt
bonds, will, therefore, unfairly affect the lower classes.’63
Fuschini ended his intervention in Parliament by pointing out that France had
successfully brought order to its finances after having been obliged to pay a large indemnity to
Prussia following the French defeat in the war of 1870-71. The French, he said, had decided to
increase other taxes, such as stamp duty, and argued that similar measures could be adopted in
Portugal. Oliveira Martins was not convinced by this comparison to something that had
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happened in France two decades earlier. His doubts were somewhat justified, for as well as
being a much richer country than Portugal, France was also an important exporter of capital, a
significant proportion of which was repatriated through increases in French interest rates: this
effectively compensated France for the export of capital that had been imposed by the war
indemnities. The Minister preferred to compare Portugal with other countries, especially Spain
which, in 1876, reduced the interest payable on its internal public debt by two-thirds; Italy
which, in 1863, reduced the interest on its internal debt by 8.8 percent; and Austria which had
reduced the same interest rate by 16 percent.64 However, with the exception of the Spanish
example, all of these countries were making less drastic cuts than those that Oliveira Martins
was proposing for Portugal.65
Martins’ budget was approved by the Chamber on 13 February 1892, following which it
was passed to the Finance Committee, headed by João Franco, from the Partido Regenerador.
Two days later, it was returned to the Chamber in the form of a Parliamentary Bill. The Finance
Committee had limited the 30 percent tax to earnings from interest on the internal public debt it
had exempted earnings from the foreign debt from taxation, and left all other national bonds
subject to a 10 percent tax rate on interest earnings. With this important change, the Minister’s
Bill was accepted by the members of both major parties and passed into law on 26 February
1892. Only the three Republican deputies voted against it.66 According to an observer: ‘The
politicians of all parties, being in complete agreement with public opinion throughout the
country, recognized that the system of administrating large deficits – which implied the need to
seek credits – was the major cause of the [recent] financial and economic disasters.’67 Such
consensus was not new among Portuguese political parties. However, contrarily to previous
consensus, this time it was not clearly exposed by the parties involved and many historians
have failed to notice its existence.68
The Prime Minister however wanted to go even further and Oliveira Martins left the
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government in disagreement, at the end of May 1892, and Dias Ferreira himself assumed the
Ministry of Finance. Immediately afterwards, Ferreira managed to gain the agreement of the
Parliament’s Finance Committee, controlled by the regeneradores that had been denied to
Oliveira Martins. On 13 June 1892, Ferreira decreed that interest payments on foreign debt paid
in gold should be reduced to one-third, with the remainder being paid in Bank of Portugal notes
after the deduction of the 30 percent tax that had been applicable to all interest earnings paid in
Portugal since February 1892. These combined measures reduced the nominal interest paid to
foreign bondholders from 3 to 1 percent.69 Unlike Martins, Ferreira made no reference to the
rights of foreign creditors with whom Martins had attempted to reach an agreement in relation
to that part of their interest payments that were now to be paid in Portuguese currency. The
reaction in Paris was negative, particularly so given that, as Finance Minister, Dias Ferreira had
prejudiced foreign creditors more (who saw their interest rates reduced by 66 percent) than he
had domestic creditors (who suffered a 30 percent reduction), even although they were to be
paid in gold.70 The impact of Dias Ferreira’s measures was huge and the price of Portuguese
bonds sold abroad fell to 20 to 30 percent of the par value throughput 1892-1902.71
The Partido Regenerador finally returned to power in February 1893. Its leader, Serpa,
was unable to lead the government and the younger Hintze Ribeiro was appointed as Prime
Minister. In the meantime Hintze had ‘made-up’ with João Franco, who ensured that Fuschini,
one of his important allies, was awarded the Finances portfolio (although he was replaced by
Hintze in December of the same year).72 While in office, Fuschini attempted to, at least
partially, satisfy foreign creditors.73 However, he could not offer to consign to them the excise
revenues received from colonial customs duties as requested without risking bringing down the
government in the process due to the extreme public sensitivity in regard to the colonies.
Instead, he confirmed Dias Ferreira’s decree of 13 June that stated that one-third of the interest
payments would be made in gold, and consigned half of all customs’ revenues (in excess of
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11,400 contos, excepting tax revenues from tobacco and cereals), and agreed to share any gains
from the decrease in the gold premium, but only once it had fallen to less than 22 percent. This
kind of procedure was a common request from the London based Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders to other peripheral governments.74 As the customs’ revenues rose, foreign
creditors received payments to the total of 2,446 contos.75 Hintze Ribeiro’s government
remained in office until 1897 which was the longest serving government of the regeneradores
since the death of Fontes, ten years before.
V
The most striking conclusion to which the analyses of the policy measures taken to
surpass the 1891 financial crisis in Portugal leads is that in no moment of the political debate
within the national government was there a serious concern of the reaction of foreign markets
in relation to any of the measures taken. In order for the government to take the decision to
default the payment of its debt to foreign bondholders, in 1892, there was a radicalization of
political life. It all began with the accession to power of the Partido Progressista, in 1886, and
the succession of Finance ministers of the left. These ministers wanted to revise the policy
which had been followed for decades by right-wing Partido Progressista and to change the
way public finances were conducted in Portugal. The radicalization of political life was further
enhanced by the accession to power of Martins and Dias Ferreira, who had never been engaged
directly in party politics and who followed policies that would radically change the way state
business was conducted. When Dias Ferreira, following a first move by Oliveira Martins,
decided to default on foreign bondholders, he showed no concern towards the effects that such
measure would have in the capacity of the country to raise further loans in the international
capital markets.
The Portuguese government had few options to choose from in order to solve the
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serious payments crisis that the country faced in 1891. However, there other options then
default. In order not to default, the government would have to impose the payment of many
private debts to the Bank of Portugal, to increase taxation or to drastically reduce money
supply. The alternative ways of resolving the crisis would have had even more serious
consequences in the economy and thus more serious consequences in the political stability of
the country. This was a time in which the public was less keen to accept a severe contraction
in economic activity to satisfy foreign lenders. The decision to default was not uncommon
within the governments in the periphery of the international financial system and the decision
taken by the Portuguese government was not exceptional. This paper highlights the
importance of domestic factors in that kind of decision.
What happened in Portugal during the crucial years from 1891 to 1892 demonstrates
how a peripheral government had the power to decide not to comply with the rules of the
game. After all, the most powerful tool at the disposal of lenders was to suspend their loans to
the governments that defaulted, as Portuguese foreign lenders were not backed by
governments. The fact that a large share of Portugal’s trade was carried with Britain, Brazil
and Portugal’s African colonies, whereas most foreign loans were raised in Paris and Berlin,
diminished the possibility of retaliation by lenders through limiting access to international
trade. Portugal’s experience during the 1891-1892 crisis points to the weaknesses of the
international financial markets in terms of enforcement of sovereign debt repayment. The
government of a peripheral country could choose to default, if its consequences were
politically less harmful than that of alternative measures that would impact more negatively
on domestic economic interests.
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Figure 1 - Government revenue and expenditure, 1852-1913
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Source: E. Mata, ‘As finanças públicas portuguesas da regeneração à primeira Guerra
Mundial’ História Económica, iv (1993), p. 175.
Figure 2 - Public debt, 1851-1913 (contos)
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Figure 3 - Yields of British and Portuguese Consols,
1850-1913 (percent)
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M. Flandreau and F. Zumer, The Making of Global Finance 1880-1913 (Paris, 2004).
Figure 4 - Bank of Portugal Gold Reserves/Circulation,
1854-1913
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Sources: R. P. Esteves et all. ‘Market integration in the golden periphery - the Lisbon/London
exchange, 1854-1891’ Banco de Portugal Working Paper, no. 15-05 (2005); J. Reis, ‘An art,
not a science? Central bank management in Portugal under the Gold Standard, 1854-1891’,
Banco de Portugal, Working Paper, no. 6-02 (2002); and M. Flandreau and F. Zumer, The
Making of Global Finance 1880-1913 (Paris, 2004).
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